

Radio-Frequency Retroreflector Attacks:

Multi-trojan scenario and attacks through a disordered media

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
Our problematic :

An attacker swaps a cable to later monitor it remotely.

The cable is swapped following an :


Attack scenario :

- Evil maid attack
- Supply chain attack




The modified cable does not emit anything, yet, the attacker can monitor it. How !?

Secret data changes the state of a retroreflector variable load.
Retroreflector states modulate the backscattered illumination signal.





At a few meters we can recover data, but only the color probed by the implant.
(Demonstration running after the presentations.)

The previous methodology can be adapted to allow interrogation of multiple implants.




To discriminate between implant we used the phase difference due to them being not co-located. (More details in our poster)

We also made a PoC for ethernet 100BASE-TX (125 Mbit/s).





Measurements made at a distance of 4 m in an anechoic chamber.

Focalization using a cavity containing two metasurfaces.



The metasurfaces create an array of 152 programmable pixels, each configuration shaping the wavefront coming out of the cavity.

Compared to a simple horn antenna we get around 15 dB when focalizing on transmitter behind 50 cm of disordered media.



(b) Correl : 0.8



(c) Correl : 0.1

